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The Real Cost of a Full
Bailout
Don A Rich,
www.lemetropolecafe.com
08/22/08
A recent study from the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) has zero
credibility. It pegged likely taxpayer
losses in the Freddie Mac bailouts at
$25 billion. For those with a sense of
history, it is worth remembering that
the S&L bailout had a $160 billion
price tag. The numbers diverge so far
from reality as to be laugh-out-loud
funny. Funny, that is, except that the
CBO estimate demonstrates a willful
disconnect with the actual
consequences of federal government
actions.
As demonstrated below, the real cost
of the bailouts will easily exceed
$1.3 trillion. In fact, the real cost
is likely to range between $1.3
trillion to $1.6 trillion, and is not
unlikely to reach $2.5 trillion.

Between 2001 and 2007, Fannie and
Freddie purchased or guaranteed $700
billion of Alt-A and subprime loans.
Given the default rates on these loans
— and the fact that the price of the
housing that is the ultimate security
of the loans will, for reasons
demonstrated below, fall by at least
thirty percent — this alone implies a
loss for Fannie and Freddie on the
order of $210 billion.
Fannie and Freddie acknowledge
already-impaired loans on the balance
sheet of $19 billion, which they have
used creative accounting to avoid
deleting from the shareholder equity
account. This means that Fannie and
Freddie have a maximum of $64 billion
in capital remaining.
Given the inevitable losses on the
Alt-A/subprime portion of their
portfolio, it must be the case that if
the federal government, as it is
doing, guarantees Fannie and Freddie's
solvency, the difference between the
loss and the capital to be made up by
the government (i.e., the taxpayers)
must equal, not $25 billion but $147
billion.
That alone would mean that the CBO is
blowing smoke with their estimated
cost figures, and if you think back to
the S&L cost of $160 billion, this is
not a surprising result. The real
picture is so much worse that it is
pretty obvious the CBO is flat out
inventing figures just to get the
politicians through November.
The real story is simple. We have
witnessed the largest asset-price
bubble in US history, making the
tech-stock bubble seem like an
overdone weekly rally.
When you look at the graph of the
Case-Shiller residential real-estate
index, an index dating from 1890 to
the present and an index which
measures the cost of housing in
comparison to other goods, the first
thing you see is that the 2001 to 2006
bubble stands out like a fifty foot
saguaro cactus in a patch of daisies.
There simply has never been anything
like it before.

When you know what you are looking at
— the biggest bubble in history — it
is scary.
To be precise, the Case-Shiller Index
in its entire 110-year history had
never crossed 140 until the recent
bubble. In 2006, it reached 210. Every
single real-estate bubble in the past
has at best been followed by a fall
back to at least the 110 level in the
postwar era, although the bubble
preceding the Great Depression
witnessed a fall to 60.
What this means is that in the
best-case scenario, real-estate prices
have to fall in the medium to long run
by almost half.
Now consider Fannie and Freddie. Just
looking at their portfolios on the
balance sheet without the guarantees,
let us accept (for no particular
reason other than a desire that the
reader sleep better at night) that
real-estate prices only fall by thirty
percent.
Well, since Uncle Sam is now committed
to "doing whatever it takes," that is
a loss right there of $1 trillion.
This committment to keep financial
markets open as usual is made in spite
of the overwhelming evidence that what
we have been taught is usual is in
fact delusional, given that Fannie and
Freddie own $3 trillion and change of
mortgages.
The CBO is not fence-post stupid, so
obviously just as in the S&L fiasco in
1988, they are outright inventing
figures so that the politicians can
slither into November and then
announce, Whoops! our numbers were a
little low.
The more realistic scenario is
actually worse. Fannie and Freddie own
and guarantee a total of more than $5
trillion in mortgages.
Given the long-run historically
plausible equilibrium values of
residential real estate as embodied in
the Case-Shiller Index, that means
that the taxpayer loss definitely
reaches $1.3 trillion, easily ranging
up to $1.6 trillion.
Unfortunately, that is the good news.
The bad news is that if real-estate
prices were to replicate the Great
Depression (as would surely occur in
the case that hedging instruments of
Fannie and Freddie were to
catastrophically fail due to
counterparty failure — and given the
absurdly low risk premiums on
credit-default swaps at the height of
the bubble, such an event cannot be
considered unlikely) the Case-Shiller
Index tells us that the loss to the
taxpayers could exceed $2.5 trillion
dollars.
I don't know what those people in
Washington are taking to sleep at
night after all their electorally
driven accounting and finance
exercises, but I can tell you what
they will be doing to keep the
government open for business: printing
a whole lot of money.
Chairman Bernanke has the discount
window open to any collateralization
not worth the paper it is written on,
so in effect he has the helicopters
ready to drop hundred-dollar bills
over Wall Street — as he once famously
described the ultimate policy
instrument of a fiat-money system.
The Creature from Jekyll Island
Of course, if he does that, we will
have to change his nickname from
Helicopter Ben to Hyperinflation Ben,
which answers the question of who
picks up the tab of bailing out Fannie
and Freddie: anyone owning dollars.
Produce a lot of something, and it
becomes worth less. And given the
losses at Fannie and Freddie, the
taxpayer guarantee, and the ongoing
initiation of Boomer retirement, only
the inflation tax will work to pay for
keeping Fannie and Freddie afloat.
Like it or not, we are about to enter
interesting times, and it is too bad
our supposed professional civil
servants at the Congressional Budget
Office have failed to tell the emperor
the truth: that he is buck-naked
bankrupt and getting ready to take a
lot of people with him.
Our only hope is to (1) accept up
front a twenty-percent fall in
American living standards for a people
living beyond their means for the past
twenty-five years on the delusions
made possible by fiat money, and (2)
simultaneously discipline the creature
from Jekyll Island, a.k.a. the Federal
Reserve System, not to create new
money just to prop up asset-price
bubbles
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